Security Management Model

SECURITY MANAGEMENT MODEL

A security management model is meant to be a generic description of what an organization should do to provide a secure environment for itself. 

ACCESS CONTROL MODEL

Access control models for e-government systems are crucial for ensuring that only authorized individuals have access to government resources and information. 

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): RBAC is a widely used access control model that assigns permissions to users based on their roles within an organization.

In the context of e-government, users are typically assigned roles such as citizen, government employee, administrator, etc. Permissions are then granted based on these roles, allowing users to access only the resources and information necessary for their designated roles.

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC): ABAC is a more flexible access control model that considers various attributes of users, resources, and the environment when making access control decisions. 

Attributes such as user roles, department, time of access, location are taken into account. 

Mandatory Access Control (MAC): MAC is a strict access control model where access decisions are based on security labels assigned to both users and resources. Users and resources are assigned sensitivity labels (e.g., confidential, secret, top secret), and access is granted or denied based on predefined security policies. MAC is commonly used in government and military settings where data confidentiality is paramount.

Discretionary Access Control (DAC): DAC is a more flexible access control model where resource owners have the discretion to control access to their resources. Resource owners can grant or revoke access permissions as needed, providing greater autonomy but also requiring careful management of access rights.

Rule-Based Access Control (RBAC): RBAC is an access control model that uses rules or policies to govern access decisions. Rules define conditions under which access is granted or denied, based on factors such as user attributes, resource attributes. RBAC is suitable for e-government systems with complex access control requirements that cannot be adequately addressed by simpler models.

NIST CONTROL MODEL 

 

The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) Cybersecurity Framework provides a comprehensive set of guidelines, best practices, and controls for managing and improving cybersecurity posture within organizations. It includes a set of controls and recommendations that organizations can implement to enhance their cybersecurity defenses. These controls are organized into several categories based on the functions of the framework: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. 

Identify:

Risk Assessment: Conduct regular risk assessments to identify, prioritize, and mitigate cybersecurity risks to the organization.

Protect:

Access Control: Implement and enforce access controls to ensure that only authorized users and systems can access sensitive information and resources.

Detect:

Anomalies and Events: Implement monitoring and detection mechanisms to identify and respond to cybersecurity incidents and suspicious activities in a timely manner.

Respond:

Response Planning: Develop and implement incident response plans and procedures to effectively respond to and recover from cybersecurity incidents.

Recover:

Recovery Planning: Develop and maintain continuity of operations and disaster recovery plans to ensure timely recovery of information systems and data following cybersecurity incidents.

TECHNICAL MODEL 

 

1. Bell-LaPadula Model

The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model is a formal security model used primarily in computer security to enforce access control policies. It was introduced by David Elliott Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula in 1973. The BLP model is primarily concerned with enforcing confidentiality policies, particularly in multi-level security environments where information is classified into different sensitivity levels.

Properties of Bell-LaPadula :

 

• The BLP model defines security levels for both subjects (users or processes) and objects (resources or data). 
• Security levels are typically hierarchical and consist of a set of ordered sensitivity levels, such as "Top Secret," "Secret," "Confidential," and "Unclassified."
• The Simple Security Property (no read-up) states that a subject at a certain security level (e.g., "Secret") cannot read data at a higher security level (e.g., "Top Secret").
• The Star Property (no write-down) states that a subject at a certain security level cannot write data to a lower security level.
• The BLP model introduces a *-property, which ensures that subjects with the same security level cannot interfere with each other's access to objects.

 

2. Biba Model

The Biba model is a formal security model named after its creator, Kenneth J. Biba, introduced in 1977. It primarily focuses on integrity rather than confidentiality, although it can be used in conjunction with other models to provide comprehensive security. The Biba model is particularly useful in environments where data integrity is of utmost importance, such as financial systems, critical infrastructure, and healthcare.

• Similar to the Bell-LaPadula model's security levels, the Biba model defines integrity levels for both subjects (users or processes) and objects (resources or data).
• Integrity levels are often represented as labels and typically follow a hierarchical structure, such as "Low," "Medium," and "High."
• The Simple Integrity Property (no read-down) states that a subject at a certain integrity level should not read data from objects at a lower integrity level.
• The Star Integrity Property (no write-up) states that a subject at a certain integrity level should not write data to objects at a higher integrity level.
• The Biba model also includes a concurrency property, which ensures that subjects with the same integrity level cannot concurrently modify objects to maintain the integrity of the system.

 

3. Clark- Wilson Model

The Clark-Wilson model is a formal security model designed to address integrity in information systems, particularly in commercial environments where data consistency and correctness are critical. It was developed by David D. Clark and David R. Wilson in 1987. Unlike the Biba and Bell-LaPadula models, which are primarily concerned with confidentiality, the Clark-Wilson model focuses on ensuring that data remains accurate and consistent throughout its lifecycle.

• Access Control Triple:
  • The Clark-Wilson model uses an access control triple to regulate access to data and operations. This triple consists of:
    • Constrained Data Item (CDI): Data items that are subject to integrity constraints and can only be modified through authorized transactions.
    • Transformation Procedure (TP): Procedures or programs that manipulate CDIs to ensure integrity. 
    • Integrity Verification Procedure (IVP): Procedures that verify the integrity of transactions and data manipulations performed by TPs.
• • This separation helps prevent unauthorized or fraudulent activities by requiring multiple parties to collaborate for certain operations.
  • An enforcement mechanism ensures that only certified TPs and IVPs are used in the system, preventing unauthorized or malicious modifications to data.
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  • The Clark-Wilson model emphasizes the importance of auditability by maintaining a detailed audit trail of all transactions and data manipulations.

 

4. Chinese Wall Model

The Chinese Wall model, also known as the Brewer and Nash model, is a security model designed to address conflicts of interest in access control policies, particularly in commercial environments where confidentiality and data segregation are critical. It was introduced by David D. Clark, David R. Wilson, and Jerome H. Saltzer in 1978. The model is named after the concept of a "Chinese Wall" used in business and legal contexts to prevent conflicts of interest.

• Conflict of Interest:
  • The Chinese Wall model addresses scenarios where individuals or entities may have access to sensitive information from multiple competing organizations or entities. For example, in financial services, a consultant may have access to confidential information from multiple clients, and there could be conflicts of interest if the consultant uses information gained from one client to benefit another.
• Data Segregation:
  • The model focuses on segregating data into distinct categories or "compartments," where each compartment represents a set of information related to a particular organization or entity.
  • Access to data within each compartment is restricted to authorized users who have not previously accessed data from competing compartments. This restriction aims to prevent conflicts of interest and unauthorized information disclosure.
• Access Control Policy:
  • The Chinese Wall model employs a dynamic access control policy that dynamically enforces access restrictions based on the user's previous access history.
  • When a user accesses information from a particular compartment, the model ensures that the user is subsequently restricted from accessing information from competing compartments to prevent conflicts of interest.

 

5. Graham-Denning Access Control Model

The Graham-Denning Access Control Model is a formal model for specifying and analyzing access control policies in computer systems. It was introduced by R.M. Graham and D.C. Denning in 1972. This model provides a framework for defining access control rules and mechanisms to enforce security policies within a computer system.

Entities:

The model defines several entities, including subjects (users or processes), objects (resources or data), and rights (permissions or operations).

Protection State:

The protection state of the system is represented by a set of access control rules that specify the allowable operations that subjects can perform on objects.

Access Control Matrix:

The access control matrix is a central concept in the Graham-Denning model. It is a two-dimensional matrix that represents the access rights of subjects to objects.

Rows of the matrix correspond to subjects, columns correspond to objects, and each cell contains the rights that a subject has over an object.

Access Control Operations:

The model defines three fundamental operations to manipulate the access control matrix:

1. Grant: Adds rights to a cell in the access control matrix, allowing a subject to access an object.
2. Revoke: Removes rights from a cell in the access control matrix, restricting a subject's access to an object.
3. Create: Establishes new entries in the access control matrix to define access rights for new subjects and objects.

Security Properties:

The Graham-Denning model defines three security properties:

4. Simple Security Property: A subject can access an object only if it has been granted access rights to that object.
5. *-Property (Star Property): A subject can pass access rights to another subject only if it possesses those rights.
6. Discretionary Security Property: A subject can grant access rights to another subject only if it possesses those rights.